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Our study examines whether internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms
moderate the relationship between a firm's engagement in corporate environ-
mental disclosure (CED) and earnings management (EM) practices in an
emerging economy. Using a sample of 100 Jordanian listed firms from 2010 to
2014 (i.e., 500 firm-year observations), our findings reveal that while the rela-
tionship between CED and earnings manipulations is negative, the links
between CG arrangements and EM are heterogeneous in that they might have
either reduced or increased earnings manipulations in Jordan. Furthermore,
some CG structures, such as board size, managerial, and institutional owner-
ship structures have moderating effects on the CED-EM nexus. Our research
highlights the significance of considering internal CG mechanisms to explain
the link between CED and EM in the context of emerging economies. Our
results help to explain and place into setting the earlier mixed results on the
association between CED and earnings manipulations and most importantly
add to the debate about whether CG structures detrimental to the CED-EM
nexus. This study allows for a richer understanding of how managers respond
to CED initiatives and CG reforms in relation to reducing earnings manipula-
tions, which offers policymakers, board directors and managers, a set of
context-specific recommendations related to the crucial need for more con-
certed efforts to ensure corporate sustainability in emerging economies.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In an era of climate change, constraints of natural
resource and other socio-environmental pressures, Corpo-
rate Environmental Disclosure (CED) has been
increasingly pushed to the forefront of corporate decision-
making and communication (Albitar, Hussainey, Kolade,
& Gerged, 2020; Cho & Patten, 2007; Gerged, 2020; Ger-
ged, Beddewela, & Cowton, 2020; Gerged, Matthews, &
Elheddad, 2020; Lu & Abeysekera, 2017). We define CED
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as the provision of information to external parties about a
corporation's environmental policies, activities and perfor-
mance (Deegan, 2002). CED can involve critical environ-
mental issues and their effects on firms' future financial
performance, material items of expense or income, envi-
ronmental policies, and other uncertainties and risks
(Birkey, Michelon, Patten, & Sankara, 2016). Such issues
are expected to be of interest to a large group of users
involving, investors, lenders, and shareholders that are
concerned about environmental sustainability due to its
economic, social, and political implications (Gray, Javad,
Power, & Sinclair, 2001; Lehman & Kuruppu, 2017). CED
can also be advantageous in improving corporate reputa-
tion, reducing the cost of capital and strengthening firms'
negotiation power and market competitiveness (Bae,
Chang, & Yi, 2018; Sarumpaet, Nelwan, & Dewi, 2017).
Theoretically, a firm engages in CED either as a legitimiz-
ing tool (Chen, Cho, & Patten, 2014; Lu & Abeysekera,
2017) or it can be driven by managers attempt to “oppor-
tunistically” use CED as a green washing tool to cover up
their unethical behaviors such as earnings management
(EM) (Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020; McWilliams,
Siegel, & Wright, 2006). Although the first theoretical
stance suggests a significant and negative relationship
between CED and earnings manipulations, the second
one hypothesizes the opposite relationship (Kim, Park, &
Wier, 2012).
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), EM occurs
when “managers use judgment in financial reporting and
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting
numbers,”p. 386. Prior studies have concluded many
motivations for corporate engagement in EM such as
avoidance of possible regulatory interference (Adiel, 1996;
Collins, Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995), meeting analysts'
forecasts (Kasznik, 1999; Payne & Robb, 2000), equity
offerings (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998), and achieving
specific contract-related objectives (Abarbanell & Lehavy,
2003). Dechow and Sloan (1991) indicates that managers
do engage in EM to maximise the plans of their overall
executive compensation. Others, nevertheless, argue that
a corporation's management seemed to participate in
managing the reported earnings to avoid debt covenants
violation (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994;
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994).
Managers perceive the reported earnings as a critical
metric for stakeholders to assess not only firms' financial
performance, albeit also executive compensation and
firms' survival prospects in the future (Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal, 2005). Managers, therefore, might have a strong
incentive to manipulate earnings figures in order to
maximize their compensations (Xu, Taylor, & Dugan,
2007). Even though earnings manipulation might not be
violating the generally accepted accounting standards in
a given context, yet it can present a misleading picture of
a firm's financial performance to outsiders (Rahman &
Ali, 2006).
The existing CED-to-EM literature seems to have sev-
eral weaknesses. First, a few researchers have investi-
gated the relationship between environmental
disclosures and EM worldwide (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Liu,
Shi, Wilson, & Wu, 2017; Pyo & Lee, 2013; Sun, Salama,
Hu'ssainey, & Habbash, 2010). Fewer studies, neverthe-
less, have examined the CED-EM nexus in the context of
developing countries (Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri,
2020). Our research, therefore, extends the existing body
of literature by offering new evidence about the relation-
ship between CED and EM in an emerging economy has
recently undergone substantial governance and regula-
tory transformations, namely Jordan. The first critical
question we pose for this study addresses this empirical
gap; is CED associated with EM?
Yip, Van Staden, and Cahan (2011) indicate that the
association between CED and EM is a context-specific,
mainly related to the governance and regulatory envi-
ronment. Given that, the findings of examining the
CED-EM nexus are primarily attributable to differences
in the governance systems across countries. Compli-
ance with corporate governance (CG) practices can
improve the integrity of financial reports and act as a
deterrent to earnings manipulation (Uadiale, 2012).
Drawing on previous studies (e.g., Fama & Jensen,
1983; González & García-Meca, 2014; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), our research focuses secondly on the
monitoring role of CG mechanisms in reducing corpo-
rate engagements in EM activities. Consequently, we
pose the second critical question; is corporate compli-
ance with good CG practices attributed to EM in the
context of developing countries?
Third, meanwhile, few prior studies have assessed the
impact of CED on EM (Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri,
2020; Kim et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2017; Pyo & Lee, 2013).
Others have investigated the connections among tradi-
tional CG arrangements and EM (Al-Haddad &
Whittington, 2019; Beasley, 1996; Chen & Zhang, 2014;
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002; Peasnell,
Pope, & Young, 2005; Roodposhti & Chashmi, 2011;
Talbi, Omri, Guesmi, & Ftiti, 2015; Uadiale, 2012). In
contrast, prior research examining how can a company's
internal CG structure moderates the association between
CED and EM is scarce (Sun et al., 2010). Thus, this study
distinctively examines the crucial policy questions of why
and how CG might moderate the link between CED and
EM in developing economies?
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Arguably, these weaknesses within the extant
accounting literature limit our understanding of why and
how a corporation's CED engagement might enhance or
hinder the quality of its reported earnings, and whether
internal CG arrangements can moderate the CED-EM
nexus. Thus, our study contributes to the existing litera-
ture as follows. First, we provide a piece of new evidence
on the CED-EM nexus from an under-researched devel-
oping context, namely Jordan. Second, we examine the
potential effects of CG mechanisms on reducing earnings
manipulations in Jordan. Third, our research investigates
the expected moderating role of CG arrangements on the
CED-EM nexus in Jordan.
Our objectives in this article are three-fold. First,
we aim to examine the CED-EM nexus in an emerg-
ing economy. In stating our aim, we purport that
companies, which are deemed to be environmentally
responsible, in this case, by engaging in substantive
CED practices, maybe engaging in corporate irre-
sponsibility behaviors if they also perform EM simul-
taneously. Furthermore, by collecting our data from
the Jordanian context, we also shift the focus of CED-
to-EM studies to emerging economies, which have
been much neglected in previous studies of a similar
nature (Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Sun et al., 2010).
Second, we aim to investigate the potential effects of
CG structures in Jordan on CED-EM nexus from 2010 to
2014. In doing so, our findings can assist policymakers in
assessing the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in reducing
earnings manipulations after the 2009 CG reforms in Jor-
dan. Finally, our study aims at extending the body of exis-
ting literature by examining the moderating role of CG on
the link between CED and EM in developing economies
that apply the UK voluntary style of CG on a “Comply-or-
Explain” basis.
Our findings are three-fold. First, using a comprehen-
sive CG, CED, and EM manually collected dataset, our
results suggest that high-CED firms seemed to be less
engaged in earnings manipulations. Second, we indicate
that corporate compliance with good CG arrangement
reduces, to an extent, firms' engagement in EM. Third,
our study demonstrates that the negative impact of CED
on EM when combined with CG is stronger than CED on
its own, meaning that some CG structures have a moder-
ating effect on the CED-EM nexus. Overall, our econo-
metric models are robust to various types of
endogeneities, in addition to alternative CG and CED
proxies.
The remainder of this paper is designed as follows.
Section 2 reviews the previous CG, CED and EM litera-
ture; Section 3 describes research design; Section 4 pre-
sents empirical results and robustness checks;
Section 5 concludes the main findings, limitation and
recommendations.
2 | BACKGROUND, THEORY,
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW,
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 | Environmental regulations,
reporting, and CG developments in Jordan
Jordan is located in the Middle East region and inhabited
by about 9.53 million (Department of Statistics-Jordan,
2016). The Jordanian economy is characterized with
inadequate supplies of natural resources (Al-Akra, Ali, &
Marashdeh, 2009). Amman stock exchange (ASE) dated
back to 1930 and considered an enormous stock
exchange in the Middle East with 241 listed companies
(Gerged, 2018).
The role of government in propagating mandatory
corporate engagement in environmental responsibilities
has changed in Jordan. For example, the Environmental
Protection Law No.12 of 1995 has been amended by the
Government in 2003 and accepted by both Houses of Par-
liament and King of Jordan in 2006 to enforce corporate
adherence to various environmental responsibilities
(Gerged, Cowton, & Beddewela, 2018). Likewise, in 2003,
the Ministry of the Environment has introduced a new
regulatory framework to contribute to sustainable devel-
opment and to preserve the natural resources of Jordan
(Bani Khalid, Kouhy, & Hassan, 2017). Similarly, the
Jordan Environment Society (JES) was established in
1988 to protect the environment, and to collaborate with
other parties to determine and tackle the environmental
challenges (Al-Sharari, 2014). Corporate involvement in
environmentally responsible behaviors has, nevertheless,
remained as a part of a voluntary framework to achieve
sustainable development in the country (Omar &
Simon, 2011).
In 2009, new CG reforms were introduced in
Jordan by ASE for listed companies to comply with
(Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019). The 2009 CG reforms
in Jordan aims at (a) developing a regulatory framework
to regulate the relationship between ASE and its listees;
(b) defining rights, duties and responsibilities; and
(c) safeguarding stakeholders' rights (JCGC, 2009).
Though, as the CG code in Jordan is applied on a
comply-or-explain basis, managers might still be tempted
to manipulate the reported earnings (Al-Haddad &
Whittington, 2019). Consequently, we believe that
Jordan, as a developing country, offers an interesting set-
ting in which to examine the expected moderating role of
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CG on the CED-EM nexus after the introduction of the
2009 CG reforms.
We intriguingly shed light on Jordan as a part of the
MENA region in which the structure of ownership is
largely concentrated in large shareholders hands, and the
investor protection degree is poorly rated (Al-Haddad &
Whittington, 2019; Gerged, Matthews, & Elheddad, 2020).
For instance, as opposed to the traditional agency conflict
in developed economies (i.e., the conflict of interests
between shareholders and managers), in Jordan, it appears
to be between minority and controlling shareholders
(e.g., large block holders or companies) (Al-Haddad, Ger-
ged, & Saidat, 2019). Given all what has been mentioned
above, Jordan provides us with a unique context to investi-
gate the extent to which EM activities can be influenced
by CED and CG in emerging economies.
2.2 | Theoretical framework
Three theories can be effectively used as a rationale for
the CG, CED, and EM links, namely the stakeholders'
theory, agency theory, and legitimacy theory. Agency the-
ory suggests that the information asymmetry issues that
are related to the agent-principle association can offer
opportunities for managers (the agents) to opportunisti-
cally serve their own interests rather than the interests of
their shareholders (the principals) (Koch & Schmidt,
2010). Earnings manipulations, however, may trigger
some negative consequences to management that can be
imposed by powerful stakeholders (Desai, Hogan, &
Wilkins, 2006; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). In an
attempt, thus, to mitigate such possible penalties, man-
agers have a tendency to compensate those stakeholders
by publishing environmental information along with
their compliance with CG provisions (Gargouri,
Shabou, & Francoeur, 2010; Prior, Surroca, & Tribó,
2008). This means that companies with high levels of
CED and adherence to CG provisions are unlikely to
manipulate their reported earnings.
Stakeholders theory, on the other hand, proposes that
managers consider stakeholders' goals in the decision-
making process (Jensen, 1993; Lu & Abeysekera, 2017);
thus, they might attempt to refrain from any ethically
undesirable behaviours, such as EM, in consort with sig-
nifying an environmentally responsible image, in this
case using CED, in order to avoid probable conflicts with
key stakeholders (Kim et al., 2012). This implies that cor-
porate engagement in CED is associated with compliance
with good CG practices that are collectively expected to
enhance the quality of reported earnings in order to
manage the impression of influential stakeholders (Al-
Haddad & Whittington, 2019).
Furthermore, legitimacy theory assumes that compa-
nies ought to carry out their economic activities in align-
ment with the expected societal norms and prospects
(Shocker & Sethi, 1973). One of the basic tenets of the
conventional legitimacy theory according to Archel,
Husillos, Larrinaga, and Spence (2009) is that there exists
between the business and the society, a social contract,
whereby adherence endorses organizations to act with
the “legitimacy” and authenticity required for the reten-
tion of its license to operate, likewise for the inexorable
use of social resources (Deegan, 2002; Shocker & Sethi,
1973). Crucially, corporations engage in several environ-
mental actions and use a number of strategies such as
adherence to CG structures to obtain and maintain their
legitimacy (Cho & Patten, 2007; Cohen, Dey, & Lys,
2008). From a legitimacy theory perspective, a company's
engagement in CED can be attributed to better-reported
earnings figures as a tool by which it can impact and
manage a society's perception of a favorable image (Sun
et al., 2010).
Following Sun et al. (2010), we use a multi-theoretical
framework, which consists of agency theory, stake-
holder's theory, and legitimacy theory, to formulate our
hypotheses and interpret the emerging results.
2.3 | Empirical literature review and
hypotheses development
Table 1 summarizes the efforts of prior researchers, most
of which are examining various aspects related to CG,
social and environmental disclosures and EM links. Pre-
vious studies seemed to have a number of shortages.
First, a few studies focused on exploring the CSRD/CED-
EM nexus in the context of developed economies such as
the US (Hong & Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Liu
et al., 2017; Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Yip et al., 2011),
the UK (Sun et al., 2010), South Korea (Pyo & Lee, 2013),
although fewer papers have recently investigated this
association in developing economies, for example,
Muttakin et al. (2015) in Bangladesh, Jordaan
et al. (2018) in South Africa, Gerged, Al-Haddad, and Al-
Hajri (2020) in Kuwait. Second, the majority of those
studies have focused on examining the relationship
between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and EM
(Hong & Andersen, 2011; Jordaan et al., 2018; Kim et al.,
2012; Muttakin et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2008; Pyo & Lee,
2013; Yip et al., 2011). For example, Yip et al. (2011)
examined the association between CSR disclosure and
EM among a sample of oil and food industries in the
United States. This study suggests that SCR disclosure is
negatively attributed to EM in the Oil and Gas industry,
although a positive association has been documented in
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TABLE 1 Systematic review of previous studies
Authors Objectives Context Results
Panel A: CED-to-EM studies
Patten and Trompeter (2003) Were among the first to examine the
CED-EM relationship.
US They found evidence that firms with
higher levels of CED took less
negative discretionary accruals,
suggesting that managers believe that
CED can be used as a tool for
reducing a firm's exposure to political
and social pressures.
Gerged, Al-Haddad, and Al-
Hajri (2020)
This study investigates the association
between corporate environmental
disclosure (CED) and earnings
management (EM).
Kuwait The results are suggestive of a
significant and negative relationship
between CED and EM in Kuwait.
Panel B: CSR/CSRD-to-EM studies
Prior et al. (2008) It investigates whether CSR activities
are used strategically by managers to
hide their EM practices.
26
countries
The results revealed a positive
relationship between social and
environmental operations and EM
practices.
Hong and Andersen (2011) It used a sample of US non-financial
firms to examine the relationship
between CSR and EM.
US Their results showed a negative
relationship between a firm's CSR
activities and EM.
Yip et al. (2011) This research investigates the CSR-EM
nexus using a sample of US-listed
companies from both the food
industry and the oil and gas industry.
US Although they found a positive
relationship between CSR and EM in
the food industry, it was significantly
negative in the oil and gas industry.
Kim et al. (2012) This study investigates the CSR-EM
nexus.
US The study found that firms that
appeared to be engaged in EM
practices have exhibited lower levels
of CSR, including CED practices.
Pyo and Lee (2013) This paper examines the relationship




The results show that firms with higher
CSR activities have less discretionary




This paper aims to explore the
relationship between CSR disclosures
and earnings quality.
Bangladesh Opportunistic motives drive earnings
management by Bangladeshi
companies.
Jordaan, De Klerk, and de
Villiers (2018)
This article examines the relationship




The findings suggest that companies
with better CSR performance are
highly likely to be engaged in EM.
Panel C: CED, CG, and EM studies
Sun et al. (2010) This paper examines the association
between CED and EM and the
impact of corporate governance (CG)
mechanisms on that association.
UK The paper finds no significant statistical
association between various
measures of discretional accruals
(DA) and environmental disclosure.
The article also finds that some CG
attributes affect the relationship
between CER and EM.
Panel D: CSR/CSRD, CG, and EM studies
Liu et al. (2017) This study examines the impact of
family involvement in corporate
ownership, management, and/or
governance upon the association
between the disclosure of CSR
activities and EM.
US The results indicate an insignificant
relationship between CSR disclosure
and EM when family involvement is
accounted for.
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the food industries. Similarly, Kim et al. (2012) indicate
that socially responsible companies are unlikely to engage
in earnings manipulation through discretionary accruals
in the United States. Likewise, Jordaan et al. (2018) point
out that firms with more CSR disclosures are less engaged
in earnings manipulations in South Africa.
In contrast, there is a little attention has been paid to
assessing the CED-EM nexus (Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-
Hajri, 2020; Patten & Trompeter, 2003). To the best of
our knowledge, only Patten and Trompeter (2003) and
most recently Gerged, Al-Haddad, and Al-Hajri (2020)
provided empirical evidence on the association between
CED and EM in the settings of the US and Kuwait,
respectively. Third, only one study attempted to examine
the moderating effect of CG on the CED-EM nexus in the
context of the United Kingdom (Sun et al., 2010). Sun
et al. (2010) indicated that some CG structures could
affect the relationship between CED and EM.
Subsequently, our paper aims to address several weak-
nesses in the prior body of knowledge and extends the
existing literature as follows. First, we empirically investi-
gate how CED can affect EM in an under-researched
developing setting that has recently experienced substan-
tial regulatory changes and CG reforms, namely Jordan.
Second, we distinctively assess the effectiveness of CG
reforms of 2009 in Jordan in reducing corporate engage-
ments in earnings manipulation from 2010 to 2014.
Finally, we uniquely examine the moderating effect of CG
internal mechanism on the association between CED and
EM in Jordan. In other words, we explore the impact of
CED on minimizing EM engagements at different levels of
corporate compliance with CG internal mechanism in Jor-
dan post the 2009 CG reforms. By doing so, we add to the
extant debate about whether CG can moderate the CED-
EM nexus. To the best of our knowledge, we offer the first
empirical evidence on the potential moderating role of CG
in the association between CED and EM in the settings of
emerging economies.
In the next subsections, the research hypotheses will
be developed based on the adopted theory, prior studies,
and the institutional setting of Jordan.
2.4 | CED and the quality of reported
earnings
Panel A of Table 1 presents the studies that have primar-
ily focused on reviewing the CED-EM link (Patten &
Trompeter, 2003; Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020).
It summarizes that studies examining how CED impacts
EM are very rare. For example, using data related to a
sample of 40 US chemical firms, Patten and
Trompeter (2003) found that CED is negatively associated
with discretionary accruals, where managers believe that
CED can be used as a tool for reducing company's expo-
sure to political and societal pressures. Likewise, Gerged,
Al-Haddad, and Al-Hajri (2020) indicate a negative rela-
tionship between CED and EM in Kuwait, which implies
that the managers of environmentally responsible compa-
nies, in this case through CED, are less likely to engage
in EM practices in Kuwait. Theoretically, Gerged, Al-
Haddad, and Al-Hajri (2020) state that companies with
good CED engagement seemed to be more conservative
in accounting decisions, providing more accurate earn-
ings information to their stakeholders. This means that
CED is driven by managers' motivations to be ethical,
honest, and trustworthy in order to legitimize their activi-
ties and to enhance their survivability prospects.
Panel B of Table 1 shows previous CSR-to-EM studies
(Hong & Andersen, 2011; Jordaan et al., 2018; Kim et al.,
2012; Muttakin et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2008; Yip et al.,
2011). For example, Prior et al. (2008) indicate a positive
relationship between CSR and EM practices. However,
Yip et al. (2011) report mixed results using a sample of US-
listed firms from both the food industry and the oil and
gas industry. On the other hand, Kim et al. (2012); Pyo
and Lee (2013) and Jordaan et al. (2018) suggest that cor-
porations with higher levels of CSR disclosure are unlikely
to engage in earnings manipulations; thus, less likely to be
a subject of scrutiny by influential stakeholders such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Likewise,
Shafai, Amran, and Ganesan (2018) conclude that corpora-
tions in Malaysia have employed CSR as an administrative
entrenchment strategy against the managerial discretions
cost, that is EM.
Theoretically, earnings manipulation might trigger
negative consequences for corporate managers that might
be imposed by influential stakeholders (Prior et al.,
2008); so, managers may attempt to mitigate any poten-
tial penalties and try to compensate stakeholders by pub-
lishing information related to their environmental
responsibility performance accompanied by reliable earn-
ings figures as a policy to be perceived as ethically
responsible (Gargouri et al., 2010). Accordingly, the first
hypothesis to examine is:
H1. Ceteris paribus, there is a statistically significant neg-
ative relationship between CED and EM.
2.5 | The CG-EM nexus: The moderating
impact of CG on the CED-EM connexion
Previous studies, specifically those conducted on devel-
oped economies suggest that compliance with good CG
arrangements can positively contribute to minimizing
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earnings manipulations and protecting the rights of
shareholders (Habbash, 2010; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al.,
2005). Specific board attributes are related to a more
active role of CG mechanisms in monitoring managers
behavior when reporting earnings figures (El Diri,
Lambrinoudakis, & Alhadab, 2020). In the current study,
we attempt to investigate the effects of two types of CG
arrangements (i.e., board and ownership structures) on
(a) limiting EM engagement, and (b) on the relationship
between CED and EM. For example, a large-sized board
might lead to less corporate participation in earnings
manipulations (Peasnell et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2000), as it is
likely to comprise of more independent and experienced
directors who can scrutinize managers activities.
Similarly, independent directors seem to have a
strong motivation to act as experienced monitors effec-
tively, and not to “collude” with managers to expropriate
shareholders' wealth for the reason that their value in the
market is dependent on their performance as indepen-
dent directors (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). From
a theoretical perspective, agency theory states that board
independence can be seen as an effective CG mechanism
in restricting “managerial opportunism” that is resulting
from the separation of ownership and control (Al-
Haddad & Whittington, 2019). The 2009 Jordanian CG
Code (JCGC) recommends that at least one-third of
members of the board of directors should be indepen-
dent. Our study is, therefore, motivated to investigate the
impact of having a third of independent directors on
boards on minimizing the engagement in EM activities in
Jordan after 2009, and how can independent directors
affect the CED-EM nexus.
Likewise, prior studies document that firms whose
CEO acts as the chairman of the board are likely to be a
subject to enforcement actions by influential stakeholders
for allegedly engaging in earnings manipulations (El Diri
et al., 2020). For example, Klein (2002), Sarkar, Sarkar,
and Sen (2008), Gulzar (2011), Roodposhti and
Chashmi (2011), Soliman and Ragab (2014), Uwuigbe,
Peter, and Oyeniyi (2014), Latif and Abdullah (2015);
Iqbal, Khan, and Ahmed (2015); Al-Haddad and
Whittington (2019) suggest that CEO-duality appeared to
be positively associated with discretionary accruals manip-
ulations. This implies that CEO-duality improves the
CEO's power and increases managerial discretion opportu-
nities (Fama & Jensen's, 1983; Jensen's, 1993). In line with
the 2009 JCGC, we assume that CEO-duality can weaken
board independence, and lead to ineffective monitoring
process in restraining managerial opportunism.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) believe that high
levels of managerial ownership can provide managers
with greater entrenchment, which means superior power
and further opportunities to exercise their opportunistic
behavior. Consistent with the “Entrenchment
Hypothesis,” managerial ownership can hypothetically
lead to increasing earnings manipulations.
Additionally, foreign ownership can play a more
significant role within CG structures because foreign
investors have a higher power to monitor managers
behavior than local investors (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom,
Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Prominent previous research
argues that foreign investors require high-quality earn-
ings information to avoid the expropriation risk of cor-
porate resources (Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019;
Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2015; Guo, Huang,
Zhang, & Zhou, 2015). In Jordan, there are no restric-
tions on foreign ownership percentage further to com-
plete freedom of capital movement, and no taxes on
capital gains (ILO, 2013). Notably, foreign investments
are representative of 49% of the total market capitaliza-
tion of the ASE (ASE Annual Report, 2015). This
means that any CG failures in Jordan might have seri-
ous consequences far beyond emerging markets and
the Middle East region. Given the fact that emerging
markets become more integrated into the global eco-
nomic system, foreign investors seem to be a major
mechanism to monitor managerial opportunism in
order to protect shareholders rights (Khanna & Palepu,
2000). Collectively, our second objective is to contrib-
ute to the existing literature by distinctively examining
the CG-EM nexus, and thus the second central hypoth-
esis to be tested is:
H2. Ceteris paribus, there is a statistically significant neg-
ative relationship between the quality of internal CG
mechanisms, as proxied by broad and ownership
structures, and EM.
Concerning the expected moderation effect of CG
mechanisms on the CED-EM nexus, there is limited evi-
dence on such an investigation (Gerged, Matthews, &
Elheddad, 2020). For example, Liu et al. (2017) examined
the impact of family involvement in corporate ownership,
management, and/or governance upon the association
between the disclosure of CSR activities and EM. The
findings indicate an insignificant relationship between
CSRD and EM when family involvement is accounted
for. More relatedly, Sun et al. (2010) investigated the
association between CED and EM and the impact of CG
on that association in the United Kingdom. This study
concluded no significant statistical association between
EM and CED, while some CG attributes found to be
moderating the relationship between CED and EM. Our
final objective is, therefore, to expand the existing body
of studies by remarkably investigating how can corporate
compliance with good CG arrangements affect the CED-
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EM nexus in the context of emerging economies, and
thus the final hypothesis to be tested is:
H3. Ceteris paribus, the higher (lower) the CG quality, the
more (less) negative is the relationship between CED
and EM.
3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Data and sample considerations
The population of our study is based on all non-financial
firms listed on the ASE, with complete data for the years
from 2010 to 2014. Mainly, the financial institutions were
excluded from our sample for several reasons. First, finan-
cial firms are predominantly expected to have an indirect
association with the environment (Thompson & Cowton,
2004). Second, the financial sector is heavily regulated as
compared with non-financial sectors, which may differently
influence its performance and reporting practices (Huang &
Wang, 2015). Finally, excluding financial institutions is in
line with prior studies, which similarly adopted such a strat-
egy (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). We, therefore, focus on
industrial and services corporations. The exclusion of the
financial institutions resulted in a final sample of 100 firms
(500 firm-year observations); 50 services companies and
50 industrial companies. Table 2 presents the sampling
criteria of the current study.
We have combined various databases in order to
examine our research questions. The predictor variable,
outcome variable, moderator variables, and control vari-
ables have been primarily collected from companies'
annual reports that published on the official website of
the ASE, accompanied with Perfect Information Data-
base, and Trade Mubasher Database.
3.2 | Measures
Table 3 explains how the research variables have been
operationally defined. In testing the research hypotheses,
we divided our research into four stages. First, we mea-
sure CED in annual reports among a sample of Jordanian
listed firms from 2010 to 2014 using both unweighted
and weighted disclosure indices. Second, we use the dis-
cretionary accruals as a proxy for the possible incidence
of EM following Kothari et al. (2005). Third, we investi-
gate (a) the association between CED and EM, and
(b) the relationship between CG arrangements and EM
using a set of panel data techniques. Fourth, we examine
how CG mechanisms can affect the CED-EM nexus.
We use the environmental disclosure index (EDI) that
has been recently developed by Gerged et al. (2018). The
EDI includes a total of 55 environmental items, which
are divided into five main sub-indices. These sub-indices
are differently weighted as follows: environmental policy
(5 items), pollution by product and process (22), energy
(10), financial (7), and other environmental items (11).
The vast majority of previous EM literature
(e.g., Bona-Sánchez, Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-Martín,
2011; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-
Hajri, 2020; Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2010; Hazarika,
Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012; Lakhal, Aguir, Lakhal, & Malek,
2015; Lee & Masulis, 2011; Pelucio-Grecco, Geron,
Grecco, & Lima, 2014; Rodríguez-Pérez & Van Hemmen,
2010; Sun, Liu, & Lan, 2011; Wilson & Wang, 2010) seems
to employ discretionary accruals as a proxy for
EM. Therefore, we detect earnings manipulations in Jordan
by discretionary accruals estimated employing the model of
Kothari et al. (2005). Kothari model applies similar drivers
to the Modified (Jones, 1991) model (i.e., revenues and gross
property, plant and equipment's) in order to estimate non-
discretionary accruals and consequent residuals. Kothari
model, nevertheless, highlights that the modified Jones
seemed to exhibit a rise in discretionary accruals when a
corporation is growing. For this reason, Kothari accounts
for the return on assets (ROA) as a tactic to control for any
extreme operating performances. The Kothari model is esti-
mated cross-sectionally each year. Accordingly, the calcula-













+ β4ROA it or it−1ð Þ + εit
TABLE 2 Sample selection
procedure
Description 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Pooled
Initial sample 251 251 251 251 251 1,255
Excluded
Financial sector companies (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (540)
Missing annual reports (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (175)
Final sample 108 108 108 108 108 540
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where, TACCit is the total accruals computed as the company's
net income before extraordinary items for the year less cash
flows from operations, deflated by company's end of the year
total assets, TAit−1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at
the end of year t−1, ΔREVit is sales revenues of firm i in year
t fewer revenues in year t − 1, ΔRECit is the change in
accounts receivables. PPEit/TAit−1 is gross property, plant and
equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by TAit−1, ROAit
is the return on assets, which is earnings before extraordinary
items scaled by lagged total assets, α β1 β2 β3 β4 are estimated
parameters, and εit is the residual that represents this study
proxy for discretionary accruals. The absolute values of the
residuals from applying Kothari model are used for multivari-
ate regression analysis.
Following Bland and Altman (1997), we used Cronbach
α technique to evaluate the inter consistency and reliability
of our EDI (Bland & Altman, 1997). The result is indicative
of the α value of .80, which is considered an acceptable level
of reliability for the EDI (Bland & Altman, 1997).
Additionally, to address any possible endogeneities
linking to omitted variables, we employ a set of firm-
specific determinants to control for the investigated
relationships (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). The care-
fully chosen controls are the firm size (SIZE), leverage
(LEV), market to book ratio (MKTB), profitability (ROA),
and audit type (big4). We have chosen these control vari-
ables in agreement with prior studies (see Albitar et al.,
2020; Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019; Al-Haddad et al.,
TABLE 3 The operational definitions of research variables
Variable Operational definition
Dependent variable
EM Earnings management measured by the absolute values of the residuals from the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005)
model.
Independent variables
EDI The total environmental disclosure score measured by the un-weighted environmental disclosure index.
WEDI The applied EDI consists of 55 items cover five sub-indices. These indices have not equally weighted. Therefore, to
check the robustness of the primary results to the weighting of the five categories of the EDI, we follow previous
literature in constructing a weighted index. An alternative environmental disclosure index called WEDI was
constructed, where equal weights of 20% have been awarded to each category.
EDI1 Environmental policy sub-index, which includes five environmental items out of 55 items included in the developed
EDI.
EDI2 Environmental pollution sub-index, which includes 22 items out of 55 items included in the developed EDI.
EDI3 Environmental energy sub-index, which includes 10 out of 55 environmental items included in the developed EDI.
EDI4 Environmental, financial sub-index, which includes 7 out of 55 items included in the developed EDI.
EDI5 Environmental other sub-index, which includes 11 out of 55 items included in the developed EDI.
Moderator variables
BIND Board independence, equal to the proportion of independent directors on the board to the total number of directors on
the board.
BSIZE Board size, equal to a total number of directors on the board.
CEODUAL CEO-duality is a dummy variable equals 1 if the same person holds CEO and the chairman positions, 0 otherwise.
MANGOW Managerial ownership, equal to the proportion of shares owned by board members and their relatives to the total
number of shares outstanding.
INSTITOW Institutional ownership, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the institutions.
FOREOW Foreign ownership, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors (non-Jordanian).
LARGEST The largest shareholder, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder who does not serve
as an executive officer or director.
Control variables
FSIZE Firm size, equal to the natural log of total assets.
LEV Leverage, measured as total liabilities scaled by total assets.
ROA Return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets.
MKTB Market to book ratio.
BIG4 Dummy variable set one if the firm is audited by the big 4-audit firm, zero otherwise.
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2019; Crifo & Forget, 2015; Fifka, 2013; Gerged, Al-
Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020; Gerged, Beddewela, & Cowton,
2020; Gerged, Matthews, & Elheddad, 2020; Ntim, 2016).
3.3 | Analysis
Multivariate regression analyses the relationships
between CED, CG, and EM, and if at all, an association
exists, it describes the degree of significance. In line with
prior CED, CG, and EM research (e.g., Gerged, Al-
Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020; Harjoto, 2017; Kiesewetter &
Manthey, 2017; Kim et al., 2012; Salem, Ezeani, Gerged,
Usman, & Alqatamin, 2020), we employ an ordinary least
squares (OLS) model as an estimation method, assuming
that all associations are linear, and the data is normally
distributed (Gujarati, 2003; Born & Breitung, 2016).
According to Wagner (2005), OLS estimation is an effec-
tive method if (a) the errors unit was assumed to be iden-
tically and independently distributed, (b) the errors were
homoscedastic hypothetically, and (c) the traditional lin-
ear regression assumptions were accomplished. This
analysis is supplemented with conducting a random-
effects model and a generalized method of moments
(GMMs) model to address any concerns regarding the
potential existence of firm-level heterogeneities and
endogenieties, respectively. The primary model can be
stated as follows.
EMit = β0 + β1EDIit + β2BINDit + β3BSIZEit
+ β4CEODUALit + β5MANGOWit
+ β6INSTITOWit + β7FOREOWit
+ β8LARGESTit + β9CONTROLit
+ β10Years Fixed Effectst + εit
ð1Þ
where EM is earnings management, EDI is an environ-
mental disclosure index; BIND is board independence,
BSIZE is board size, CEODUAL is CEO duality, MAN-
AGOW is managerial ownership, INSTITOW is institu-
tional ownership, FOREOW is foreign ownership,
LARGEST is the largest shareholder. CONTROLS are firm
size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), Market to
book ration (MKTB), and finally, audit type (BIG4).
4 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION
4.1 | Univariate analysis
Table 4 represents the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables included in this study. The first row of Table 4
shows that the mean value of EM (0.197), which varies
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.492 and its
standard deviation is 0.096. Consistent with prior studies,
such as Hayes (2009) Zang (2012) Kang and Kim (2012),
Goh, Lee, and Lee (2013), Kuo, Ning, and Song (2014)
Al-Haddad and Whittington (2019) Gerged, Al-Haddad,
and Al-Hajri (2020) the mean value of EM proxy in this
study is just about zero, suggesting that the model fit the
data reasonably well. The EDI is also positive with a
mean value of 0.094, which is very low, which means that
CED is still at an early stage in Jordan. The standard
deviation of EDI is 0.062. Further, the mean value of the
weighted EDI (WEDI), an alternative measure of CED, is
0.006, with 0.006 standard deviations. The results of the
univariate analysis are aligned with previous CSR/CED-
to-EM studies (see Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020;
Jordaan et al., 2018; Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Shafai
et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2010).
For CG structures, Table 4 shows that the mean value
of board independence (BIND) is 0.34, signifying that less
than half of the sampled Jordanian listed companies are
broadly in agreement with the recommendations of the
ASE, which emphasize that at least one-third of the
board members are independent directors. The mean
value of board size (BSIZE) is 8.09, while the mean value
of CEO duality (CEODUAL) is 0.17. This means that
about 83% of our sampled firms comply with the JCGC
requirements. Regarding ownership structures, Table 4
presents that the mean value of managerial ownership
(MANGOW) is 0.507 (50.7%), which is very high
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs M SD Min Max
EM 540 0.197 0.096 0 0.492
BIND 540 0.383 0.232 0 1
BSIZE 540 8.09 2.18 5 13
CEODUAL 540 0.17 0.376 0 1
MANGOW 540 0.507 0.266 0 0.958
INSTITOW 540 0.445 0.262 0 0.95
FOREOW 540 0.163 0.202 0 0.905
LARGEST 540 0.356 0.213 0.087 0.95
EDI 540 0.094 0.062 0 0.309
WEDI 540 0.006 0.006 0 0.03
FSIZE 540 16.92 1.339 14.416 20.303
LEV 540 0.338 0.228 0.016 0.918
ROA 540 0.018 0.079 −0.236 0.167
MKTB 540 1.316 0.92 0.24 4.14
BIG4 540 0.378 0.485 0 1
Note: The variables are operationally defined in Table 3.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GERGED ET AL. 11
compared with other emerging economies. For example,
Ali, Salleh, and Hassan (2008) reported a mean value of
9.9% for MANGOW in Malaysia, and of 10.7% in Saudi
Arabia, as presented by Alghamdi (2012). Table 4, fur-
thermore, shows that the institutional ownership
(INSTITOW) is associated with a mean value of 37%,
although foreign ownership (FOREOW) is of 17% (0.07)
mean value. The average value of 17% for FOREOW is
lower than the whole market proportion as a result of a
high FOREOW in the finance sector that is excluded for
comparability reasons. Additionally, the largest share-
holder (LARGEST) has a mean value of (0.356) 36%, con-
firming a high level of concentration among the sampled
Jordanian companies.
In addition, Table 4 shows a higher level of leverage
(LEV) measured by total debt to total assets ratio in
Jordan than other developed economies (Zalata &
Roberts, 2016). Even though our sampled firms are char-
acterized with a low-level of profitability measured by the
ROA ratio compared with Korean firms, for instance
(Kang & Kim, 2012), yet the market to book (MKTB)
ratio is higher than the one reported by Goh et al. (2013)
in the Korean context. Additionally, big four auditing
companies (BIG4) have audited only 37% of the sampled
Jordanian companies.
4.2 | Bivariate analysis
Table 5 shows the correlations matrix for the dependent
and independent variables in order to test the
assumption of multi-collinearity. It reports the coeffi-
cients of Pearson (parametric) correlation. The nature of
Pearson coefficients suggests that any residual non-
normal distribution in our research variables might be
mild, and are also comparable to those stated by previous
studies (e.g., Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019; Gerged,
Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020; Goh et al., 2013; Hayes,
2009; Kang & Kim, 2012; Kuo et al., 2014; Zang, 2012).
VIF has been tested separately, and the results show that
multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern in
explaining the regression results.
4.3 | Multivariate analysis
4.3.1 | CED and earnings management
Table 6 presents different sets of tests to examine the rela-
tionship between CED, CG arrangements, and earnings
manipulations. The findings of conducting a multivariate
regression analysis using an OLS estimation method, and
supplemented by doing a random-effects model and a
GMM model are presented in p values on the basis of
Newey and West standard errors, correcting for the
impact of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity issues.
Multicollinearity should not be a sever statistical problem
as the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.59. All
four models of Table 6, whose adjusted R2 differ between
.57 and .59, display a significant negative relationship
between CED and EM, consistent with both our hypothe-
ses and vigorous to the form of EDI used (either EDI
or WEDI).
We run the first model to examine the impact of CED
and CG structures on EM using OLS regression models.
This type of regression helps to mitigate the problems of
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity effects (Gujarati,
2003; Wooldridge, 2013). The findings of model 1 of
Table 6 show that CED has a significant negative effect
on EM (−0.773***) at the 1% level of significance, which
signifies that firms engaged in CED are less likely to
engage in unethical behaviors such as EM in Jordan. In
other words, environmentally responsible firms are not
engaging in irresponsible behaviors such as EM practices.
Our results, therefore, confirm the concept of corporate
responsibility behaviors (i.e., more CED and less EM)
among a sample of Jordanian companies. This means
that H1 has been statistically supported. Our findings are
consistent with those of previous studies (e.g., Gerged,
Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020; Patten & Trompeter, 2003;
Sun et al., 2010) that have confirmed that companies
with high CED practices are highly unlikely to manipu-
late their reported earnings. Theoretically, it appears that
companies with good CED engagement tend to be con-
servative in accounting decisions, providing more accu-
rate earnings information to their stakeholders (Gerged,
Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020). This means that CED is
driven by managers' motivations to be ethical, honest,
and trustworthy in order to legitimize their activities and
enhance their survivability prospects (Kim et al., 2012).
As Table 3 shows, the applied EDI consists of 55 items
cover five sub-indices are environmental policy (EDI1),
pollution (EDI2), energy (EDI3), financial environmental
category (EDI4), and others (EDI5). To check whether
the negative association between the main EDI and EM
proxy is driven by a particular category of these five sub-
indices, we regress each one of these categories on EM
individually (see Models 1–5 of Table 7). The results sug-
gest that all the five sub-indices have been negatively
associated with EM proxy in Jordan, which is in line with
the main findings of examining the EDI-EM nexus. Spe-
cifically, EDI1, EDI2, EDI3, EDI4, and EDI5 have signifi-
cant and negative relationships with EM at a 1% level of
significance (i.e., p = −.785***, p = –.914***,
p = –.914***, p = –.554***, and p = –.928***, respec-
tively). In other words, corporate reporting on policy,
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pollution, energy, financial, and other environmentally
related information has led to reductions in managers'
engagement in earnings manipulations among a sample
of Jordanian listed firms. This implies that our main
results are not sensitive to or driven by a specific type of
environmental disclosure.
Given the fact that the five sub-indices of the EDI
have not been equally weighted,1 we check whether our
primary results were sensitive to a WEDI. We, therefore,
follow previous literature in constructing a WEDI
(e.g., Gerged et al., 2018; Gerged, Al-Haddad, & Al-
Hajri, 2020; Gerged, Beddewela, & Cowton, 2020; Gerged,
TABLE 6 Environmental disclosure index and earnings management
Variable Model1 (PooledOLS) Model2 (RE) Model3 (GMM) Model4 (interaction)
BIND 0.335*** 0.584*** 0.874*** 0.625***
BSIZE 0.003 0.007** 0.006 0.004
CEODUAL −0.018 −0.007 0.026 0.002
MANGOW −0.213*** −0.333*** −0.483*** −0.342***
INSTITOW −0.082*** −0.088*** −0.113*** −0.029
FOREOW 0.113** 0.212*** 0.210** 0.020
LARGEST 0.778*** 0.845*** 0.711*** 0.270***
w_EDI −0.773*** −0.777*** −0.330** −0.209***
w_FSIZE −0.009** −0.008 −0.017 −0.008
w_LEV 0.019 −0.004 −0.030 −0.012
w_ROA −0.010 −0.083 −0.010 −0.042
MKTB 0.009* 0.008 −0.001 0.008
















_cons 0.393*** 0.279*** 0.379 0.327
Observations 540 540 432 540
R2 .572 .558 .593
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: The research variables have been fully defined in Table 3.
*Statistical significance at the 10%.
**Statistical significance at the 5%.
***Statistical significance at the 1%.
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Matthews, & Elheddad, 2020; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013;
Ntim, 2016). An alternative WEDI is constructed, where
equal weights of 20% have been awarded to each of the
five sub-indices. Model 1 of Table 8 shows the results of
running an OLS regression model to examine the WEDI-
EM nexus. The result indicates that WEDI is significantly
and negatively associated with EM at a 1% level of signifi-
cance (p = −0.221***), which is consistent with the lead-
ing results presented in the Model 1 of Table 6. This
means that our results have not been affected by
weighting the five sub-indices differently.
Using the fixed-effects or random-effects estimations
can address some statistical concerns that may not be
tackled, employing OLS regression methods (Gujarati,
2003). Following Wooldridge (2010), we employ fixed-
effects and random-effects techniques to control for
unobservable firm heterogeneities over time that is likely
to be constant, yet may affect the predictor-outcome
nexus, which is probably not recognised by using OLS
estimation method. The appropriateness of using a
random-effects rather than a fixed-effects estimation
method was decided using the Hausman test, which con-
firmed that the unobserved firm-specific variables were
significantly related to those of the other companies our
sample. We found that the random-effects model is more
appropriate than the fixed-effects model. Based on the
random-effects model (model 2 in Table 6), there is a sig-
nificant negative relationship between EDI and EM
(p = −.777***). Also, we found a negative and significant
association between the weighted disclosure index
(WEDI) and EM using a random-effects estimation
(Refer to Model 2 of Table 8). This implies that the find-
ings of running OLS methods, which were presented in
Model 1 of Table 6, are not statistically affected by firm-
level heterogeneities.
Remarkably, though not the focus of this study, the
employed control variables have various effects on earnings
manipulations in Jordan. For example, large-size firms
(FSIZE) tend to be less engaged in earning manipulations,
whereas MKTB is positively associated with EM. On the
TABLE 7 Environmental
disclosure sub-indices and earnings
management
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
BIND 0.586*** 0.586*** 0.586*** 0.586*** 0.586***
BSIZE 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
CEODUAL −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007
MANGOW −0.336*** −0.336*** −0.336*** −0.336*** −0.336***
INSTITOW −0.088*** −0.088*** −0.088*** −0.088*** −0.088***
FOREOW 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213***
LARGEST 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845***
w_FSIZE −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008
w_LEV −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
w_ROA −0.084 −0.084 −0.084 −0.084 −0.084
MKTB2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008






_cons 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.281***
Observations 540 540 540 540 540
R2 .532 .526 .536 .572 .549
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The research variables have been fully defined in Table 3.
**Statistical significance at the 5%.
***Statistical significance at the 1%.
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other hand, profitability (ROA), leverage (DOA), and audit
quality (big4) cannot predict EM in the context of our study
(refer to Table 6). Our results in this regard are aligned
with those of previous EM literature in emerging
economies (e.g., Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019; Gerged,
Al-Haddad, & Al-Hajri, 2020).
4.3.2 | CG structures and earnings
management
Model 1 of Table 6 suggests that compliance with the
Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) has a het-
erogeneous impact on corporate engagement in earnings
TABLE 8 Weighted environmental disclosure index and earnings management
Variable Model1 (PooledOLS) Model2 (RE) Model3 (GMM) Model4 (interaction)
BIND 0.586*** 0.335*** 0.874*** 0.636***
BSIZE 0.008** 0.003 0.006 0.004
CEODUAL −0.007 −0.018 0.026 0.001
MANGOW −0.336*** −0.214*** −0.484*** −0.337***
INSTITOW −0.088*** −0.082*** −0.113*** −0.033
FOREOW2 0.213*** 0.113** 0.210** 0.020
LARGEST2 −0.845*** −0.779*** −0.714*** −0.776***
WEDI −0.221*** −0.211*** −0.881** −0.359***
w_FSIZE −0.008 −0.009** −0.018 −0.008
w_LEV −0.004 0.020 −0.031 −0.013
w_ROA −0.084 −0.011 −0.011 −0.041
MKTB2 0.008 0.009* −0.001 0.008
















_cons 0.281*** 0.394*** 0.236** 0.236**
Observations 540 540 432 540
R2 .572 .566 .592
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: The research variables have been operationally defined in Table 3.
*Statistical significance at the 10%.
**Statistical significance at the 5%.
***Statistical significance at the 1%.
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manipulations in that they might have either decreased
or increased EM engagement in Jordan. This means that
H2 has not been accepted. Specifically, BIND, FOREOW
and LARGEST have significant positive relationships
with EM (p = .335***, p = .113** and p = .778***),
respectively, whereas both of MANGOW and INSTITOW
have a significant negative effect on EM (p = −.213***
and −p = .082***). On the contrary, we could not find
any significant effects of both BSIZE and
CEODUAL on EM.
As can be seen from Model 1 of Table 6, BIND is posi-
tively and significantly attributed to EM, suggesting that
independent boards are unlikely to take control of earn-
ings manipulation in Jordan. This result is in line with
previous CG-to-EM studies such as Ge and Kim (2014),
Sun and Liu (2016), and Al-Haddad and
Whittington (2019). This positive coefficient is in line
with the perspective of market pressure, which implies
that stronger board governance is associated with a
higher level of EM (Ge & Kim, 2014). In this regard,
Osma (2008) suggest that managers might attempt to
hide earnings-related information from the board in an
effort to compromise the decision of independent direc-
tors. Also, the independence of directors in Jordan might
be mostly questionable. For example, Al-Haddad and
Whittington (2019) state that nepotism is a common
factor affecting the appointment of board directors in
Jordan. In line with the “Convergence of Interests'
Hypothesis,” MANGOW is found to be a useful CG
mechanism in mitigating earnings manipulation in Jor-
dan. This finding also confirms the findings of previous
studies such as Ali et al. (2008); Klein (2002); Al-Haddad
and Whittington (2019). With regard to the negative asso-
ciation between INSTITOW and EM, our finding is con-
sistent with those of previous studies such as
Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012). This means that
sophisticated INSTITOW in Jordan might have a greater
capacity to analyze the managerial actions from a long-
term perspective and deter managers from engaging in
earnings manipulations.
Furthermore, Model 2 of Table 6 presents the results
of estimating a Random-Effects model to investigate the
CG-EM nexus. The results of running a random-effects
regression model are consistent with the main results of
using OLS regression in Model 1 of Table 6. Specifically,
we found significant and negative effects of MANGOW
and INSTITOW on earnings manipulations in Jordan. In
contrast, the effects of BIND, BSIZE, FOREOW, LARG-
EST are positive on EM. In addition, there is no signifi-
cant effect of CEODUAL on EM. The main findings of
conducting a random-effects model are consistent with
the finding of the OLS model. In other words, the effect
of CG structure on earnings manipulations is
heterogeneous in that they might have either reduced or
enhanced EM in Jordan. This implies that our results
were not statistically affected by unobservable firm-level
heterogeneities.
Our results, moreover, are in line with the results of
those studies that have explored corporate compliance
with CG arrangements voluntarily following the UK
“comply-or-explain” compliance regime (e.g., Aguilera &
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Haddad & Whittington, 2019;
Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009),
which emphasized the need for additional reforms. Com-
pliance with CG mechanisms in Jordan is a voluntary
type of practices because CG provisions are not primarily
enforceable by law, and listed companies may not inevi-
tably be responsible for being not compliant with a spe-
cific CG provision if they have provided a genuine
explanation. Our findings suggest that implementing the
JCGC voluntarily has yet to yield comprehensive reduc-
tions in EM in Jordan. This implies that introducing
other mandatory enforcement arrangements for CG pro-
visions, such as attaching CG provisions to listing rules
for corporations to comply with, may result in reducing
earnings manipulations for those well-governed firms in
Jordan. This implication agrees with the findings of Low
and Cowton (2004) that state that corporate compliance
with CG codes may be subject to legal enforcement
mechanisms.
4.3.3 | The moderating effect of CG
structures on the CED-EM nexus
To answer the third question in our study, we use the
interaction of EDI with CG structures. More specifically,
to determine the potential moderating effect of CG struc-
tures on the CED-EM nexus, Equation (1) is re-regressed
with an inclusion of the EDI*BIND, EDI*FOREOW,
EDI*MANGOW, EDI*INSTITOW, EDI*BSIZE,
EDI*CEODUAL, and EDI*LARGEST.
Observably, based on the interaction model, Table 6
model 4 shows a significant effect of MANGOW,
INSTITOW, and BSIZE ownerships on the relationship
between EDI and EM and consistent with the results of
Sun et al. (2010), the coefficients of (EDI* MANGOW),
(EDI*INSTITOW) and (BSIZE*EDI) are significantly neg-
ative at 10 and 1% levels. This suggests that MANGOW,
INSTITOW, and BSIZE moderate the relationship
between EDI and EM; thus, firms with a higher percent-
age of MANGOW and INSTITOW and larger BSIZE tend
to act ethically by reporting their environmental informa-
tion along with accurate earnings figures simultaneously.
In other words, some CG structures can enhance CED
ability to explain variations in EM as compared with
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examining the CED-EM nexus directly. This result sug-
gests that H3 is empirically supported; thus, making a
new important contribution to previous CED literature.
4.3.4 | Additional sensitivity checks
Arellano and Bond (1991) claim that dynamic panel data
methods perhaps are reliably estimated by applying
random-effects and/or fixed-effects estimators only,
where the regressor is, by nature, not firmly exogenous.
Using the main proxies for CED (i.e., EDI and WEDI),
CG structures (i.e., board and ownership structures), and
EM (i.e., Kothari model), we, consequently, use a gener-
alized method of moment (GMM) estimator as an addi-
tional sensitivity check to ensure that the principle
findings of our study were not severely affected by the
likely incidence of endogeneities.
Following previous literature (e.g., Adegbite, Guney,
Kwabi, & Tahir, 2019; Gerged & Elheddad, 2020;
Moumen, Othman, & Hussainey, 2015; Reguera-
Alvarado, Blanco-Oliver, & Martín-Ruiz, 2016; Roberts &
Whited, 2013; Ullah, Akhtar, & Zaefarian, 2018), we
employ a two-step system GMM model as sensitivity
check to address the potential occurrence of endogeneity
problem arising from reverse causality association
between CED and EM. Specifically, this research incorpo-
rates the lagged versions of past EM to differentiate
between a “static” and a ‘dynamic’ panel data model.
The specification of a two-step system GMM regression is
shown in the following equation:
EMit = α0 + β1 EMit−1 + β2 EMit−2 + β3 EDIit + β4BINDit
+ β5BSIZEit + β6CEODUALit + β7MANGOWit




β10 CONTROLSit + μit + εit
ð2Þ
In Equation 2, EMit−1 indicates 1 year lag of the EM (pre-
vious year's EM), and EMit−2 represents a second lag of
the EM (the dependent variable). These lagged values of
the dependent variable are deemed as explanatory vari-
ables in the two-step GMM system. Roodman (2009)
states that by including lags of the dependent variable
(EM in this study), the 2-step GMM2 estimation controls
for endogeneity by transforming the data internally as a
dependent variable's previous value is subtracted from its
current value.
Model 3 of Table 6 and Model 3 of Table 8 present the
findings of estimating the GMM models. Our results
show that both EDI and WEDI still have a significant
and negative impact on EM at a 5% level of significance
(refer to Model 3 of Tables 6 and 8). This means that our
findings remain robust to endogeneity concerns.
In sum, our extra analyses make us fairly confident
that the results do not suffer from any endogeneity prob-
lems, and are also not sensitive to alternative CED
proxies.
5 | CONCLUSION
Despite theoretical arguments that boards and top man-
agement often drive the decision to engage in CED prac-
tices, though previous evidence on how and why CG
mechanisms might moderate the CED-EM nexus is very
rare. This study, thus, examines the vital subject of how
and why a corporation's CED practices may be associated
with its engagement in EM and consequently, whether
CG structures can moderate this association in emerging
economies.
Our findings suggest that CED is negatively associ-
ated with earnings manipulations, which signifies that
firms engaged in CED are less likely to engage in EM in
Jordan. Theoretically, high-CED companies seemed to be
more conservative in accounting decisions, providing
more accurate earnings information to their stakeholders.
This means that CED is driven by managers' motivations
to be ethical, honest, and trustworthy in order to legiti-
mize their activities and to enhance their survival pros-
pects (Kim et al., 2012). Furthermore, companies'
compliance with the JCGC might have either reduced or
enhanced EM engagement in Jordan. Our results empha-
size the need for additional reforms as the JCGC of 2009
has yet to yield comprehensive reductions in EM in
Jordan.
Additionally, some CG structures (i.e., BSIZE
MANGOW, INSTITOW) have a moderating effect on the
link between CED and EM in Jordan. The results are not
sensitive to alternative measures for CED and CG vari-
ables, firm-level heterogeneity, and endogeneity
problems.
Given the voluntary nature of CG regime on a “com-
ply-or-explain” basis in Jordan and other emerging econ-
omies in the MENA region (see Gerged & Agwili, 2020;
Gerged, Matthews, & Elheddad, 2020), our empirical
findings reiterate the crucial need for more concerted
efforts to be undertaken by the Jordanian government,
the JSE and other national regulatory organizations, such
as JES, to develop new enforcement arrangements for CG
provisions that may lead to reducing earnings manipula-
tions for those well-governed with high-CED firms in
Jordan. Our empirical evidence can, therefore, help
policymakers and corporate managers in other emerging
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economies of a similar nature to the Jordanian context
(i.e., voluntary CED and CG regimes, large ownership
structures, controlling-to-minority shareholders agency
types of conflicts), such as Egypt and Morocco, to effec-
tively use CED practices as a tool aims to decrease EM
engagements at higher levels of corporate compliance
with CG arrangements.
Our results are rigorous and robust, whereas some limita-
tions should be acknowledged. First, the CED, CG, and EM
data were manually collected, which needed a lot of commit-
ment in relation to time and therefore limited our focus to a
sample of Jordanian listed companies. Further studies are rec-
ommended to extend this investigation beyond a single coun-
try setting to a cross-country setting such as the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region. Second, although our CED
indices are quantity and quality-oriented ones (weighted and
unweighted), future researchers may improve this analysis by
employing alternative CED and CG proxies (e.g., number of
words/pages/sentences counted and CG index). Third, due to
data limitations, the empirical examination is confined to
internal CG structures. In the future, researchers are also rec-
ommended to offer new insights by investigating how and
why external CG mechanisms such as national culture, laws,
politics, and market forces can affect the CED-EM nexus in
developed and developing countries.
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1 5 environmental policy items (9%); 22 environmental pollution items
(40%); 10 environmental energy items (18%); 7 environmental, finan-
cial items (13%) and 11 environmental others items (20%).
2 We use the Sargan test and the Arellano–Bond tests as post-
estimation to be able to determine the validity of the GMM
models and whether the lags of EM in Equation 2 (i.e., the instru-
ments) are correctly specified. The findings of conducting the two
pre-estimation tests turn out to be insignificant, which implies
that the included instruments in the GMM estimation are exoge-
nous; thus, our instruments are proven to be valid.
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